In 1997 Mexico introduced Personal Retirement Accounts (PRAs) which, after a transition phase, will completely replace the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. We give a detailed overview of the relevant institutional framework, the market of PRA providers and how it has evolved since the 1997 reform. We use administrative data obtained from CONSAR, the regulatory agency of the PRA system to assess how pension fund management fees affect pension accumulations. We find that fees can drain up to a quarter of individuals' pension savings.
INTRODUCTION
The introduction of individual or personal retirement accounts (PRA) has been considered as one important reform option for the U.S. Social Security program. There are a number of issues related to PRA schemes that make studying other countries' experiences with PRAs highly instructive for policy makers in the U.S. in order to avoid certain pitfalls of implementation, should this option be considered further, or to add policy designs that remedy some disadvantages. For example, PRA schemes in their purest form do not leave room for redistribution. Mexico has implemented a minimum pension benefit to provide for those with otherwise insufficient pension income.
The PRA design in Mexico is based on three pillars: first, a flat rate minimum floor that is the minimum pension guaranteed by the government; second, personal retirement accounts managed by private pension fund managers, and third, voluntary saving accounts for retirement (World Bank, 1994) . In the case of public pension systems, in the pure design of defined benefit (DB) plans, the risk is borne by the government. The PRA system distributes the risk of saving for retirement in a different way compared to DB schemes. In the first pillar, the government bears the risk for lower-income workers guaranteeing a minimum pension for those most disadvantaged in the labor market. The second pillar, introduces financial instruments for saving for retirement and the risk is borne by the employee. The third pillar provides complementary saving options to the mandatory second pillar for saving for retirement with the benefit of tax advantages. In the U.S. tax favored voluntary saving options have been available in the form of 401(k) plans and Individual Retirement Accounts for over 30 years.
In 1997 Mexico introduced Personal Retirement Accounts (PRAs) which, after a transition phase, will completely replace the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. We use administrative data obtained from CONSAR, the regulatory agency of the PRA system to assess how pension fund management fees affect outcomes.
We find that fees drain pension accumulations by up to 25 percent of what would have been accumulated without fees. As a result many individuals, especially of the transition generation, will receive only the minimum pension guarantee because their accumulations will not be sufficient to fund a higher pension. The extent of this happening is important to gauge the additional cost to the government. Irrespective of the accumulated pension balances, the fees lower well-being during retirement, in some cases significantly so.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents an overview of the institutional framework in Mexico. The third section describes the PRA system, the evolution of pension fund managers and their market shares, fee structures, switching behavior of individuals in the system, interest rates, and investment portfolio composition.
Section 4 presents the analysis of the impact of fees on the accumulation of pension funds.
Finally, we offer a brief conclusion and discussion.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
In Mexico, social security is mainly provided by the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) for private sector workers and the State Workers Security and Social Services Institute (ISSSTE) for public sector employees. In 1997, the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) reformed the PAYG pension system to be transitioned to a fully funded system based on personal retirement accounts (PRA). The Mexican Social Security Institute covers private sector workers who account for 38 percent of the labor force in Mexico. ISSSTE reformed its PAYG system into a PRA system in March 2007 that covers approximately 5.7% of the labor force. In this study we focus on IMSS pension system because the reform was implemented 11 years ago and this social security institute has the highest coverage of the labor force.
The PRAs are managed by private retirement fund managers (AFORES). The reform affected all workers who had not yet claimed their public pension as off July 1 st , 1997. Workers who contributed previously to the PAYG can choose at the time of retirement whether to claim benefits under the PAYG or the PRA regime. 1 We refer to these individuals as the transition generation. The IMSS computes the PAYG pension and the pension fund manager presents the PRA options of annuitization or scheduled withdrawals provided by insurance companies. The individual has 30 days to notify IMSS and the pension fund manager of the decision to opt for the PAYG or PRA. Workers who started contributing to the pension system after 1997 can only retire under the PRA rules (Aguila, 2000; Aguila, 2008) . We refer to these individuals as the new generation.
The PRA system in the Mexican case has some redistributive components: a) a monthly social quota deposited in the individual account, equivalent to 5.55% of the minimum wage of Mexico City, and b) a minimum pension guarantee equivalent to the minimum wage. Individuals obtain an annuity of at least the minimum wage of Mexico City. Chile was the first country to introduce this type of pension reform from a PAYG to PRA. The Chilean pension system includes some redistributive components such as the minimum pension guarantee and a guaranteed minimum rate of return for pension funds. In the Chilean case, the minimum pension guarantee represents approximately 62% of the minimum wage but in Mexico, the minimum pension guarantee is equivalent to a 100% of the minimum wage. Mexico does not have a guaranteed minimum rate of return for pension funds, but the government contributes to individuals' accounts the equivalent of 0.425 percent of a worker's wage and the monthly social quota (Aguila, Attanasio, and Quintanilla, 2008) . In the Mexican case, employees bear all the financial risk with a lower bound provided by the minimum pension guarantee.
To qualify for a pension under the PRA system a worker has to contribute for a minimum of 1,250 weeks which is approximately 25 years. The PAYG required only 500
weeks (approximately 10 years), and the normal retirement age is 65 in both PAYG and PRA. Early retirement is possible in the PRA system from age 60 if the individual has a sufficient balance in the individual account to obtain a pension at least equivalent to the minimum pension guarantee. Early retirement at any age is available when the person can fund a pension of at least 130% of the minimum pension guarantee with the funds in the personal retirement account. The PRA system completely changes retirement incentives.
This rule abolishes the notion of a normal or early retirement age for those that have saved enough to obtain a pension at least equivalent to 130% of the minimum pension guarantee.
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In the PAYG system, for each year that a person retires before the normal retirement age pension benefits are reduced by 5%. At age 60 pension benefits reduced for early retirement amount to 75% of the normal retirement pension.
Contributions to the pension system are defined as a percentage of workers'
earnings. The employer, employee and government contribute to the pension system. The employee and employer contributions did not change after the pension reform, remaining at 10.075 percent of a worker's wage. The government contribution to the PAYG was 0.425 percent of a worker's wage. With the introduction of the PRA the government contributes the social quota equivalent to 5.55% in addition to the 0.425 percent of worker's wage.
The government agency in charge of monitoring the performance of the PRA system in Mexico is the National Commission of Saving for Retirement (CONSAR) founded in 1994. In the next section we explore the administrative records of the performance of the PRA system obtained from CONSAR.
PERSONAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS SYSTEM
In this section we focus in the second pillar of the Mexican PRA system, which consists of the personal retirement accounts managed by pension fund managers. We describe the evolution of the number of pension fund managers, fees charged to the individual retirement accounts by pension fund managers, switching behavior of participants of the system, and the rate of return and investment portfolio of pension funds.
In February 2008, the PRA system in Mexico had 38.8 million participants. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the number of registered persons from 1998 to 2008. The number of participants has increased at an average monthly rate of 1.0 percent. Table 1 presents the number of participants by pension fund manager. Many AFORES started operations between 2004 and 2006. It is important to highlight that the PRA system reports the number of accounts in the system but some of the accounts are not active. Mexico has a high turn-over of labor and constant migration between the formal and informal sectors.
This causes some workers to contribute only for short periods of time in the formal sector.
As a result there is a large difference between the number of registered persons and those contributing. According to the latest available figures from CONSAR 83% of persons registered were actively contributing to the system in July 2003.
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The amount accumulated in the PRA system has grown in importance. Table 2 shows the amount accumulated in the PRA system from 2000 to 2008 for mandatory and voluntary contributions. Voluntary contributions are still a small fraction compared to mandatory saving. These figures illustrate the growing importance of PRAs in transitioning towards a funded pension system.
Evolution of Pension Fund Managers and their Market Share
The PRA system started in July 1997 with 17 pension fund managers (AFORES). When there are economies of scale, larger pension fund managers will always have a comparative advantage over smaller ones. In this case market shares should be regulated to promote competition and allow lower coverage pension fund managers to develop. In a later study Aguilera and Velázquez (2005) find that most firms have crossed the minimum average cost of production and therefore no economies of scale exist in the Mexican case. The authors mention that part of this was achieved by the 2001 regulatory change assigning workers who had not chosen an AFORE to the pension fund with the lowest fees.
This measure has allowed small pension fund managers to grow and consolidate in the market. 
PENSION FUND MANAGEMENT FEES AND PARTICIPANT SWITCHING

BEHAVIOR
The PRA system regulates the types of fees that financial institutions can charge. It has allowed three types of fees: load factor, fees charged on the account balance, and fees charged on the accrued interest. 5 Other countries also allow fixed fees. Even though these types of fees are the most important source of revenue for pension fund managers, there are other fees for services such deposits and withdrawals from voluntary savings accounts allowing them to create the fee system that positions them best in the market. Such a fee system may or may not be related to the cost structure faced by the firm (Barrientos and Boussofiane, 2005) nor to the performance of the pension funds (Crabbe, 2005) . For most countries however, fees are set as a percentage of contributions. Few countries set fixed fees -sometimes in addition to the percentage charged on contributions -and in other cases in addition to fees charged on the account balance (Crabbe, 2005) . Figure 4 show the evolution of the load factor, balance, and interest fees, respectively, from 1998 to 2008. We observe changes over time in these fees. 5 In the case of Chile, pension fund managers are allowed to either charge a fixed sum or a variable percentage on contributions (Mesa-Lago and Demesa, 2006) .
They are partly a result of changes in the regulatory framework mandating increased information and transparency. Table 4 shows load factor fees by main pension fund managers. In May load factor fees were between 0.0% and 1.7% (see Figure 2 ). It is important to point out that the way load factor fees are quoted makes them appear very small when in fact they translate into very high fees. We will illustrate this with an example: take a worker who earns $1,000.
Total contributions amount to 6.5% of salary or $65. A load factor fee of 1 percent is applied to the contributed amount divided by 6.5%: ( Since December 2003, load factor fees started to decline (see Table 4 ). By
December 2003, load factor fees were between 0.5% and 1.7%. This decline was due to a change in the regulatory framework. AFORES had to send out PRA statements at least once a year. In October 2002, this changed to at least twice a year, and the statement had to provide information about employee contributions, and fees charged by the AFORE.
Moreover, the switching mechanism between AFORES became more flexible. In December 2003, 2.4% of the persons registered in the PRA system were switching between AFORES (see Figure 5 ).
Therefore, the decline in load factor fees may be due to a more detailed statement providing information about fees and prompting employees to switch more actively between pension fund managers in response to the information provided. Some AFORES do not charge a load factor fee. Table 4 ).
Between 2003 AFORES with the highest market share had higher load factor fees (see Table 3 Table 5 shows the balance fees for the main pension fund managers. Figure 4 shows the market structure of fees charged on accrued interest. In May 1998 only two AFORES charged interest fees, Atlantico Promex (20%) and Inbursa (33%) (see Table 6 ). Atlantico Promex merged with Principal in November 1998. Inbursa was the only one charging an interest fee until March 2003.
Another factor playing a role in retaining workers in a particular pension fund is the provision of discounts on fees due to tenure with the fund. The first AFORES to implement such discount schemes included Banamex and Bancomer. These discounts consisted of decreasing load factor fees by 0.01% or 0.02% or 0.05% per year after being with the same fund between two to five years. By the year 2006 most AFORES had adopted discount schemes to increase customer loyalty by making switching more costly. Some AFORES completely eliminate the load factor fee after 25 years of tenure. As a result switching between pension funds managers is less desirable because that causes a loss in tenure and the associated fees discounts.
In Table 7 we show the rules of discounts valid from 1998 to 2007 for Banamex, Bancomer, Profuturo GNP, and Inbursa pension fund managers. This table includes two of the pension fund managers (Banamex, and Bancomer) with the highest market share.
Profuturo GNP had a high market share in 1998, comparable to Banamex and Bancomer, but coverage declined substantially by 2007. We include Inbursa, a pension fund with a low market share in 1998 which caught up reaching coverage just below the two biggest pension funds but above Profuturo GNP by 2007. We observe in Table 7 that Profuturo GNP only started granting discounts in November 2002, five years after the PRA system started. Profuturo GNP has a more generous discount system than any other pension fund and still this AFORE was less successful at retaining registered individuals and attracting new participants.
Summarizing patterns of retention and attracting individuals registered in other pension funds, Table 8 shows the net number of switchers for selected pension funds.
Banamex has a successful history of attracting individuals from other pension funds in excess of the number of participants leaving Banamex (see Tables 9 and 10 Table 9 shows the leavers by main pension fund managers and Table 10 shows individuals that moved from other pension fund managers. We find that the dynamics of attracting new system participants can be quite different from those of individuals switching between pension funds. The increase in the market share of Inbursa is mainly due to new entries to the system but is has a poorer performance in terms of retention and attracting persons registered in other pension funds.
There are many factors that influence individuals' choice of pension fund manager such as the number of branches, fees, discounts for tenure as well as aspects related to the company's sales strategy. Calderón, Domínguez and Schwartz (2008) 
RATES OF RETURN AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION
The investment portfolio of AFORES is highly regulated. At the time when the PRA system was introduced, there was only one authorized investment portfolio that mandated that most of the funds had to be invested in government bonds. In Figure 6 , we present the real rate of return of AFORES for Siefore Básica 1 from 1998 to 2007 without adjusting for fees. For every month we show the median, highest and lowest rate of return and include for comparison a line for the real rate of return of the Mexican Treasury Bills, CETES. to December 2007 is 6.6% and the standard deviation is 1.30.
Comparing the real rate of return of the AFORES with that of the leading Mexican
Treasury Bills, CETES, in Figure 6 we note that from 1998 to 2003 there appears to be amazingly little correlation between the two; in fact, they appear to move in opposite directions much of the time. This is surprising because during that period the authorized portfolio mandated an investment share in government bonds of more than 95 percent. 
IMPACT OF FEES ON PRA SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
In this section we analyze the impact of pension fund management fees on PRA social security benefits. As described in the previous section, pension fund management fees have undergone drastic changes from 1997 to 2007. We assess the importance of the different types of fees for the accumulation of pension funds for a median worker. A median worker earns three times the minimum wage that is equivalent to $345 dollars per month. The monthly minimum wage in Mexico City is $115 dollars.
We assume a real rate of return of pension funds before fees of 5.44%, which is a historic average. The monthly contribution to the PRA is equivalent to 6.5% of a worker's wage including employer, employee, and government contribution. Additionally, the government deposits the social quota amounting to $6.3 per month. We assume the median worker starts contributing to the PRA system in May 1998, when we start observing pension fund management fees. Load factor fees are charged as a fraction of the worker's salary and balance fees are charged annually.
We estimate the amount accumulated in the PRA system for a median worker in each pension fund. We apply the exact fee schedule for each pension fund manager taking into account all the different types of fees, including discounts. The baseline scenario assumes no fees are charged. We compute the loss due to fees for each pension fund expressed in percent of the balance that would have accumulated without fees. That is every period we take the difference between the accumulation in a particular pension fund with fees and without fees, and divide by the scenario without fees. Changes in the slope of the loss in pension funds reflect changes in fees.
In Figure 8 we show the loss on pension balances due to load factor fees for a median worker. For balances with several AFORES the loss amounts to as much as 20 percent due to this load factor alone. We observe that the loss has not changed for most pension funds and for some it has even increased. This is the case for Sólida Banorte In Figure 12 we show the loss in pension accumulations due to all types of fees combined (load factor, balance, and interest fee) for a median worker. In May 1998, the lowest loss in pension accumulations was 0.1% of the amount that would have been accumulated without fees. This fraction rises to 7.0% in January 2008. The lowest loss is for a worker registered with Inbursa. The slope of the loss with Inbursa increases after the interest fee is eliminated and other fees were adopted.
The highest loss in pension accumulations affects clients of Profuturo GNP (23.2%
in January 2008). This is mainly due to the load factor fee. The second highest loss in accumulations would be experienced with Banamex. Confia Principal and ING occupy the third place in terms of loss of pension accumulations with 19.8% in January 2008.
Conclusions
In this paper we document that fees as they have been charged by AFORES in the Mexican PRA system have a large impact on individuals' pension accumulations, draining personal retirement accounts by up to almost a quarter of the amount that they would have accumulated without fees. Thus, it is extremely important to pay attention to the design of fees when designing PRA systems and when studying how such a reform might affect economic preparation for retirement. In the Mexican there are three different types of fees (load factor, balance and interest) that need to be taken into account. The greatest losses are due to the load factor, however.
To enhance transparency for individuals it would appear advisable restrict the types of fees to one common one to be used by all pension funds. Understanding the long-term consequences of just one type of fee is not a straightforward exercise for individuals.
Furthermore, for Latin American countries the structure of fees is generally not based on costs (Crabbe (2005) and Devesa et al. (2002) ) with the implication that competition has not resulted in a rational system of fees. These findings are similar to Soto (2005) for the Chilean case who finds that more than a fifth of pension accumulations are lost due to management fees. Fees include administrative costs and competition costs, sales personnel, differentiation, and advertisement (Crabbe, 2005) . This last element has led analysts to conclude that competition has not lead to reduced costs but instead to increased costs, eliminating economies of scale created by a large provider (Gill et al. 2008) . In Chile other costs such as sales increased substantially during the 1990s since it proved to be the best strategy for firms to retain and increase market share (Barrientos, 2005) .
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9.1 8.9 8.9 8.7 8.6 8.8 8.5 XXI 3.2 4.9 6.7 7.1 6.6 6.5 6.4 7.0 th year of tenure, the load factor fee will be discounted 0.02% per year (valid up to September 2001) From the 2 nd year up to the 6th of tenure, the load factor fee will be discounted 0.01% (valid up to May 1998) ------From the 5 th year of tenure, the load factor fee will be discounted 0.02% per year up to a max of 0.70% (valid up to December 2005) From the 2nd year of tenure, the load factor fee will be discounted 0. No changes, applies previous one.
After having 5 years of tenure, the load factor fee decreases by 0.04% per year up to a max of 10 years. After the 15 th year of tenure, load factor fee declines 0.05% until reaching 24 years of tenure. In the 25 th year the fee declines 0.07% (valid up to May 2005) No changes, applies previous one.
No changes, applies previous one.
After having 5 years of tenure, the load factor fee decreases by 0.50%. After the 10th year of tenure, load factor fee declines 0.04% per year until the 15th year of tenure. In the 16th year of tenure the load factor fee declines 0.04% per year until 24th year of tenure. In the 25th year the fee declines 0.07% (valid up to August 2005) No changes, applies previous one. No changes, applies previous one.
Cont.
After having 5 years of tenure, the load factor fee decreases by 0.44%. In the 16 th year of tenure, load factor fee declines by 0.04%. In the 17 th up to 23 rd year of tenure the fee declines by 0.05% per year. From the 24 th year of tenure the load factor fee declines 0.07% (valid up to July 2006) No changes, applies previous one.
In the 5 th year of tenure, the load factor fee will be discounted 0.30%, and in the sixth the fee declines 0.20%. In the 11 th year of tenure, the load factor fee declines 0.05% (valid up to December 2008) No changes, applies previous one.
After having 5 years of tenure, the load factor fee decreases by 0.47%. In the 17 th up to 23 rd year of tenure the fee declines by 0.05% per year. From the 24 th year of tenure the load factor fee declines 0.07% (valid up to December 2007) No changes, applies previous one.
Cont. Table 7-Discounts for selected pension fund managers from 1998 to 2007
Banamex Bancomer Profuturo GNP Inbursa No changes, applies previous one.
From the 5th year of tenure, the load factor fee will be discounted 0.485%. This change applies between and 2014 (valid up to December 2008 After having 1 year of tenure, the load factor fee decreases by 0.05%, in the second year 0.6%, in the third year 0.07%, in the fourth year 0.03%, in the fifth year 0.83%, in the sixth year 0.08%, in the seventh year 0.10%, in the eight year 0.12%, in the ninth year 0.10%, and in the tenth year the load factor fee is eliminated (valid up to December 2008) No changes, applies previous one. 632 78, 576 254, 208 376, 879 430, 885 263, 678 145, 302 396, 704 Bancomer 4, 616 15, 294 26, 990 60, [431] [432] [433] [434] [435] [436] [437] [438] [439] 192 378, 555 296, 566 XXI 3, 763 NOTE 
SOURCE: Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro (CONSAR).
